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Scandinavian countries are often portrayed in policy debates as model examples having 
shown how to square concerns for efficiency and equity. The core principle of the 
Scandinavian welfare model is an individual entitlement to public sector provisions combined 
with collective financing via taxes. However, a high employment rate is needed to ensure 
financial viability of this model. The Scandinavian model faces several challenges which 
affect the possibilities of maintaining a high employment ratio, namely, demographic 
changes, a growth dilemma and globalization. This paper discusses how these challenges 
affect the need and scope for reforms of the Scandinavian welfare model.  
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1. Introduction 
The Scandinavian countries share a number of common characteristics. They are small and open economies, 
they have a high living standard, and the distribution of income is relatively even. Moreover, the public 
sector is responsible for the distribution and allocation of a substantial amount of resources (above 50 % of 
GDP). The latter includes both a social safety net, which entitles most without any income to an income 
transfer, and a provision of welfare services with relatively high standards. Scandinavian countries are 
therefore often portrayed as having shown how to square concerns for efficiency and equity, and are often 
referred to in policy debates as model examples. 
 
The core principle of the Scandinavian welfare model is that the entitlement to public sector provisions is 
individual while the financing is collective, in the sense that they are tax financed. There is no relationship 
between the tax payment of an individual and its entitlement (common pool property). This principle of 
universalism is reflected in important welfare arrangements like education, health care, pensions etc. A 
distinguishing feature is that the standard of the public provisions is high. This means that the living standard 
offered, in particularly for those people with no or only marginal attachment to the labour market, is 
relatively high, and that the standard of public services is high in the sense that it meets the needs and 
requirements of most people. The latter implies that public service provision is neither a fall back option of 
last resort nor providing a minimum to be supplemented by privately financed additions.  
 
It is difficult to point to specific schemes or institutions that can be characterized as unique for the 
Scandinavian countries
1. Considering specific welfare arrangements one finds similar schemes in other 
countries. Hence, the Scandinavian welfare model is to some extent characterized by the way policy 
measures have been bundled rather than by unique elements.  Note also that although the Scandinavian 
countries share a number of similarities, there are important differences in the micro-structure of the specific 
welfare arrangements (see e.g. Hansen (2004), Nordic Social-Statistical Committee (2005)).  
 
Given that a large proportion of resources are allocated via the public sector it may be asserted that the 
welfare model is non-market based. It has been suggested that labour has become decommodified in the 
sense that a decent living standard is guaranteed without having to sell labour in the market. To some, this 
may seem as if the idea of social citizenship advanced by Marshall (1950) has been implemented to ensure a 
universal right to an income “not proportionate to the market value of the claimant” (Marshall, 1950, p100). 
This is not a correct representation of the Scandinavian welfare model for two important reasons, namely, 
that the model is very employment oriented, and entitlements are not in general unconditional. 
   3
The Scandinavian welfare model is very market oriented
2 with respect to labour. This is directly reflected in 
the fact that the public sector is a large actor in the labour market demanding labour for the provision of 
public services, and that various welfare arrangements like e.g. day care serve the double function of 
facilitating the supply of labour for females (see e.g. Graafland (2000)). For the welfare state to be 
financially viable, it is necessary that a large proportion of the population is in employment. The reason is 
simple. If out of job most people would be entitled to a transfer, while in job their income and thus tax 
payment is higher. Hence, for given ambitions with respect to welfare standards and tax payments the 
employment share of the population is the key balancing point for the financial viability of the model. This 
feature has pros and cons. On the pro side is that the focus on employment is one of the reasons why 
Scandinavian countries are among the countries in the world with the highest income levels, and why the 
income distribution is fairly equal. On the con side are the problems of combining generous welfare 
arrangements with incentives to work (including education, mobility etc.). 
 
While entitlements are universal in the sense that they are right-based, this does not imply that access is 
unconditional. For some services this is absurd, and for transfers this would correspond to an unconditional 
basic income (demo-grant). Access to welfare arrangements does usually presume a need, that is, access is 
conditional on being in a particular situation (illness, lack of working capability etc.). Eligibility for income 
transfers is also conditional (means-tested) in the sense that access to social assistance constituting the basic 
element of the social safety net is conditional on the individual being unable to support itself
3. Hence, 
entitlements are not unconditional, and they have a labour market focus. 
 
The aim of matching requirements for high labour force participation (high employment ratio) with concerns 
for equality is not an easy task. It raises a number of problems and dilemmas in a number of policy areas. It 
is also interesting to note that the most severe crises in recent times in the Scandinavian countries have been 
associated with significant and persistent drops in employment rates. This was the case for Denmark and 
Norway in the 1970s and 1980s leading to substantial economic imbalances and unsustainable public 
finances, and a similar situation occurred in Sweden during the 1990s’ crises. 
   
In a forward looking perspective, the Scandinavian model faces several challenges which in one way or 
another all have implications for the requirements to ensure a high employment ratio. The challenges 
include: i) changing demographics increasing the dependency ratio significantly not least due to increasing 
longevity, ii) increased demand for services (e.g. health care and education) as well as leisure stressing the 
financial balance of the system, iii) effects of globalization both directly (e.g. migration and tax base 
mobility) and indirectly (increased tax distortions due to changes in product/labour market structures). To 
this list could be added the challenge related to the risk of eroding norms as well as polarization and   4
segregation weakening the financial viability of the model, but also the homogeneity and support on which 
the model relies (see e.g. Lindbeck et. al. (2004)). It is beyond this paper to discuss this issue. 
 
While many of the challenges – demographics and globalization – are not different or worse than in many 
countries, the consequences and possible remedies must be seen in perspective of the welfare regime 
adopted. The key question is thus whether and how it is possible to address these problems without making 
fundamental changes to the welfare model. 
 
This paper discusses the particular way in which the various challenges affect the need and scope for reforms 
of the Scandinavian welfare model, and it discusses some of the proposals for reforms recently made in the 
Scandinavian countries. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights a few facts on the 
Scandinavian countries in a comparative perspective. Some of the basic policy dilemmas arising in the 
Scandinavian welfare model are briefly outlined in section 3 as a prelude to a discussion of the challenges 
faced by Scandinavian countries. The discussion of these challenges (section 4: demographic changes, 
section 5: the growth dilemma, section 6: globalisation) focuses on the employment question. The final 
section 7 comments on the policy perspectives. 
 
2.  A brief characterization of the Scandinavian countries in international comparison 
In the Scandinavian countries, a substantial amount of resources are allocated and distributed via the public 
sector amounting to about 50 % of GDP, cf. figure 1. Roughly, these expenditures are equally split between 
consumption and transfers. 


































































Note: Total public outlays in percentage of GDP 
Source: OECD  
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Public expenditures are mainly tax financed, and a key issue is how taxation
4 affects labour markets. The 
total tax wedge on labour is an indicator of the implications taxation has for the labour market, cf. figure 2. 
The Scandinavian countries are among the European countries with the highest tax wedges. However, it may  
be misleading to compare these across countries without accounting for differences in labour market 
structures. The interrelationship between wages and taxes involves a common pool problem. Taxes levied on 
labour income also finance expenditures to the benefit of workers. Accordingly, if wage formation is 
centralized, negotiators will perceive that taxes finance expenditures to the benefit of workers, and therefore 
the tax to wage spill-over will be smaller. Oppositely, with very decentralized wage setting, negotiators will 
not perceive that their own tax payments have a significant influence on aggregate tax revenue, and therefore 
the tax to wage spill-over will be stronger. Historically, labour markets have been very centralized (see e.g. 
Boeri et al (2000)) and this has tended to mute some of the tax distortions. 
 





























































Note: For an average production worker 
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2006) 
 
Given the extended form of the welfare state in the Scandinavian countries, it follows that the ratio between 
employed and non-employed in the population plays a key role. For given ambitions with respect to welfare 
services and the social safety net as well as given tax rates there is a lower bound on the overall dependency 
ratio consistent with financial viability of the welfare state. Therefore, the viability of the model depends on 
keeping a high labour force participation rate, i.e. the Scandinavian welfare model is employment oriented. 
As seen from figure 3, labour force participation rates are high in international comparison, especially for 
females. This is the outcome of a process which took place during the 1960s and 1970s, where the labour 
force participation rate for women rose to almost the same level as for men. Hence, the Scandinavian welfare 
model is a “gender split breadwinner” model. 
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One way to underline the importance of keeping a high employment rate is to consider the sensitivity of 
public finances to variations in employment. A drop in employment of 1 % would imply a deterioration of 
net-public revenue of about 0.8 % due to the combined effects of lower tax revenue and increasing 
expenditures on transfers
5. Hence, if employment drops by 1 %, the financial burden resting on the 
remaining employed increases by almost 1 % if the welfare arrangements are to remain financially viable. 
This is basically a different representation of the so-called automatic stabilizers (see e.g. van der Noord 
(2001)). In a business cycle perspective large automatic stabilizers contribute to the smoothening of business 
cycle fluctuations. However, what is a blessing in short-run business cycle context may be a curse in a 
structural context if the employment ratio for various reasons is dwindling. 
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Although labour force participation is high, it should be pointed out that working hours are not high by 
international standards, cf. figure 4. This may partly be a consequence of the high labour force participation  
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Note: In national currencies, averages over age groups 
Source: Data from Velfærdskommissionen (2005), Finansdepartementet Norge, and Finansdepartementet, Sverige. 
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It is a natural consequence of the extended welfare arrangement that there is a strong life-cycle dependency 
in the net contributions to the welfare state. The average person is a net-beneficiary as child and young (child 
care, education etc.), a net-contributor during work life, and a net-beneficiary as old (pensions, old age care). 
Naturally, at a given moment, there is a substantial dispersion across individuals of a given age, in particular 
for age groups normally considered to be work ages. Figure 5 displays the dependency of the net-
contribution on age for the three Scandinavian countries, and it clearly demonstrates the strong life-cycle 
pattern. This captures a social contract between generations in which individuals in work age groups via (net) 
tax payments provide the financial basis for welfare arrangements directed toward young and elderly 
members of society. In its outset, the social contract is of the pay-as-you-go type. This extended social 
contract – the cradle to grave model - is one key element of the Scandinavian welfare model.  
 
The Scandinavian countries are often portrayed as having escaped the efficiency-equity trade off since these 
countries have both a high income level and low inequality, cf. figure 6. The egalitarian perspective is 
reflected in entitlements, tax structure, wage structure etc. In international comparison, income inequality is 
low measured by standard metrics like the Gini-coefficient, cf. figure 6. However, more notable is the fact 
that the welfare model in particular offers (relatively) high compensation levels for groups with no or only a 
marginal attachment to the labour market (see. e.g. Hansen (2004)) 
 


























Note: Efficiency measured by GDP per capita (PPP), and equality as 100- Gini coefficient. Countries with GDP per capita above 
15,000 per year are included. Only countries at the frontier are identified. Gini coefficients are latest available estimate, GDP is from 
2003. 





   10
3.  Policy dilemmas in the Scandinavian welfare model 
There are a number of recurrent themes surfacing in the policy debate and which are intimately linked to the 
aims and characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare model. 
 
A key issue is the balance between distributional concerns and incentives for labour market participation (the 
extensive margin). Concerns for redistribution and social balance imply that the level of transfers offered 
(and minimum wages) is high. Working poor is not a policy option in keeping a high employment ratio. This 
raises two fundamental questions. One is how to ensure that there is an incentive to work
6 in particular for 
low income groups. It is difficult to use economic incentives. Making transfers and supplements (for e.g. 
housing and day-care) income dependent would imply very large effective marginal tax rates, and yielding 
tax credits raise the standard problem of how to target the intended groups without giving tax concession to a 
large part of the employees. 
 
There are some non-economic measures which can be used to ensure that high labour market participation is 
consistent with generous transfers. One measure is concerned with requirements for availability including 
active job search and willingness to move and commute for jobs etc. Another is to introduce various 
workfare elements in social policies, that is, claiming unemployment benefits or social assistance requires 
participation in various activation measures. This class of instruments has the aim of affecting the reservation 
demands for job searchers and minimizing the scope for passively claiming transfers. In principle, such non-
market instruments can ensure the same incentive to be active in the labour market as reductions in the level 
of benefits. 
7As such, they seem ideal instruments in a welfare state.  However, these instruments are not 
without problems. The schemes are administrative in nature and therefore costly to administer. Activation 
schemes in particular may be costly depending on the nature of activities used. Moreover, a too strong 
commitment on the part of the political system in taking responsibility for ensuring “full employment” may 
have detrimental effects for search activities and on the incentives underlying wage formation (see e.g. 
Calmfors et al. (2002)). In addition, there are other and possibly more important issues. Activation can have 
two aims. One is to reduce a moral hazard problem which arises when people are claiming support although 
they are voluntarily without labour income (enjoying leisure or working in the black sector). The other aim is 
concerned with improving people’s chances of finding a job (via job-training, improved qualifications etc.). 
The former can be achieved by very simple schemes (time demanding schemes), but they will often be 
considered humiliating. Implementation of such measures is also encountering the screening paradox, that is, 
if the measure succeeds in separating “deserving” and “non-deserving” claimants, it appears as if one is 
punishing the “deserving” claimants. Activation measures aiming at improving qualifications may overcome 
these constraints but are more resource demanding, and they raise the difficult question of deciding which 
qualifications would be in demand.   11
 
The active labour market policy has been highlighted as one of the reasons why Sweden in the 1970s and 
1980s managed to escape high open unemployment when most other OECD countries were facing a severe 
unemployment problem. In Denmark, a number of reforms during the 1990s made a shift from a very passive 
orientation of the labour market policy primarily focussing on income maintenance to an active policy 
including workfare elements. Spending on ALMP is high in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
Social benefits set a floor under wage formation (via legal minimum wages or negotiated minimum wages)
8.  
Since these policies are motivated by the fact that low market wages are not acceptable, it is an implication 
that some unemployment eventually follows. Not all of those who would have a market wage below the 
wage floor will be in demand if they are to be paid the minimum wage. Some unemployment is therefore a 
cost of redistributive policies. The question is how this cost can be minimized. One obvious answer is 
educational policies to ensure that the supply of unskilled labour is sufficiently small. Educational policies 
have always had a strong standing in the Scandinavian countries for the twofold reason that it is a key 
element in providing equal opportunities and breaking social heritage etc., and because it is indirectly part of 
the redistributional policy. Moreover, it enhances growth by better exploitation of the entire human capital 
potential in the population 
 
One tension in educational policies is that a compressed wage structure and high taxation have a negative 
effect on the return to education. There is a demand and supply side to the compressed wage structure
9. It 
implies that highly qualified labour is relatively cheap in the Scandinavian countries, something which has 
also recently been highlighted as a parameter of importance in international competition. However, on the 
supply side it reduces the return and thus the incentive to undertake education. In a recent study of the return 
to education, de la Fuente (2004) finds that the private return to education in Denmark and Sweden is below 
the average for the included 14 EU countries. The importance of the return to education for educational 
decisions should be seen relative to the fact that public financing of education is substantial. The 
Scandinavian countries constitute the OECD top of countries spending most public funds as a share of GDP 
on education.  
 
A different route by which to consider education is to try to assess the outcomes by indicators of the 
educational level and the quality of educations. In the quantitative dimension measured by the share of the 
population holding a PhD degree, Sweden is at the OECD top, while Norway and Denmark are below 
average. The fraction of youth not receiving any education beyond compulsory schooling is low in Norway 
and Sweden, but still almost 1/5 of a generation in Denmark. Recent PISA tests put the Scandinavian 
countries at an average position in terms of acquired skills for youth at the age of 15 (OECD 2004). Hence,   12
while the Scandinavian countries may have had an educational lead in the past, it is hard to argue that this is 
the case today. In the medium to long run, this may have important consequences for growth and 
international competitiveness. 
 
A recurrent theme is the extent to which labour markets are distorted by the high level of taxation. 
To some it may seem inconceivable that labour markets can work under such high taxation, and yet they do. 
There are several remarks to be made on this. First, taxation releases both income- and substitution effects of 
taxation, and hence the quantitative importance for labour supply of a high level of taxation is not a priori 
given. Second, for the hours decision the evidence reported in figure 4 can be taken as evidence of a 
distortion caused by taxation. However, working hours should also be seen in the perspective of the high 
labour force participation of both males and females, hence working hours at the family level are not low in 
the Scandinavian countries. Finally, centralized labour markets have undoubtedly (see Summers et. al. 
(1993)) played a role in minimizing distortions by muting the effects of taxes on wages and working hours 
(in centralized bargaining the effects on the public sector budget balance are internalized). An interesting and 
open question is whether the recent tendency towards more decentralized wage formation would imply that 
the distortionary effects of the high level of taxation would become more visible.  
 
Welfare arrangements may enhance efficiency via the implied pooling and diversification of risk. Since both 
contributions to and benefits from the welfare state are dependent on various events, the collective welfare 
policies constitute an elaborate implicit insurance contract (involving inter- and intragenerational risk 
sharing). One basic insight from the recent economics literature on the economics of the welfare state
10 is 
that a system with ex-post redistribution (based on actual income, labour market status, health etc.) in an ex 
ante perspective also serves as an insurance mechanism. If agents are risk averse, this can have direct welfare 
effects as well as incentive effects (via sharing and diversification of risk) that can enhance efficiency. 
Pursuing this line of thought reveals an important trade-off between the insurance and incentive effects of 
various policy instruments. The difficult policy problem is to ensure that the insurance mechanisms do not 
develop into permanent support, that is, the temporary nature of an insurance scheme has to be ensured. 
  
As an example of the insurance vs. incentive effects one can consider the structure of the Danish labour 
market which has drawn much attention recently under the heading of the flexicurity model. The basic idea 
is that flexible rules for hiring and firing of workers combined with a generous unemployment insurance 
scheme achieve a balance between flexibility in adjustment for firms and income security for workers. As 
such, the model can be seen as a way to square concerns for efficiency with social security. Since Denmark 
has a low unemployment rate and in many respects a sound macroeconomic situation, it has been inferred 
that this can be attributed to the flexicurity model. However, two points need to be taken into account in this   13
relation (see Andersen and Svarer (2006)). The first is that the basic ingredients of the flexicurity model were 
also in place during the 1970s and 1980s when unemployment was persistent at double digit numbers. The 
main change in labour market policy during the 1990s was a shift from a passive to an active orientation in 
labour market policies including a shortening of benefit duration and introduction of workfare elements in 
the unemployment benefit and social assistance scheme.  Second, despite the low registered unemployment 
rate it is the case that about a third of the population in the work age group is receiving some form of income 
transfer.  Hence, the model has not been unconditionally successful in ensuring high labour force 
participation. 
 
4.  The demographic challenge 
Demographic shifts are much in focus, both because they can be fairly accurately predicted and because the 
consequences are potentially larger. The demographic shifts in the Scandinavian countries are roughly of the 
same order of magnitude. The demographic old age dependency ratio thus increases from about 0.25 to 0.4 
within the next 3-4 decades, cf. figure 7. The increase is permanent due to the expected increase in longevity.  












Note: Defined as the age group 65+ relative to age group 15-64. 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden. 
 
Combining these demographic shifts with the properties of the social contract, cf. figure 5, immediately 
reveals that a financial problem will arise. Current welfare arrangements are not financially sustainable when 
the dependency ratio increases. The order of magnitude of the financial problems is substantial, and 
deteriorating public finances will lead to systematic deficits. In a recent assessment for Denmark, 
Velfærdskommissionen (2004, 5b) finds that the problem amounts to a trend deterioration of public finances 
(primary balance) of about 4 percentage points of GDP between now and 2040. For Norway, the 
demographic consequences for public finances are among the most dramatic for OECD countries. According 
to estimates, the trend deterioration in the primary balance between now and 2040 is above 6 percentage   14
points of GDP (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2004; Frederiksen et al., 2004). The sustainable use of petroleum 
wealth can finance less than 50 % of the expenditure rise due to ageing. For Sweden, estimates by the OECD 
(2005) show that the increasing dependency ratio will continuously deteriorate public finances, and the 
deterioration of the budget balance between now and 2050 amounts to 4 ½ percentage points of GDP 
(OECD, 2005).  
 
The changes in the dependency ratio have two components, namely, the effect of the baby-boom generation 
from the 40s’ approaching retirement (and the subsequent drop in fertility), and the effects of increasing 
longevity
11. Similar demographic changes are projected for most OECD countries (see e.g. IMF (2004)). The 
problems arising due to the baby-boom generation are irreversible and require some adjustment. The 
consequences of increasing longevity are gradually developing, and there is therefore time to cope with 
these.  
 
A key policy question is how to ensure that retirement ages increase alongside increases in longevity. It 
should be noted, however, that this cannot solve the entire problem, since letting retirement ages follow 
longevity is not sufficient to deal with the entire consequences of the changing dependency ratio due to the 
consequences of the baby-boom generation. Later retirement raises difficult policy questions, especially 
since average retirement ages in recent years have been declining despite increasing longevity. One can think 
of several reasons for this, including the rules and conditions for retirement, the labour market situation for 
elderly workers and preferences. 
 
Scandinavian countries have - as other countries – various schemes which affect the retirement decision in 
the form of early retirement, disability pensions and the general properties of the pension system. Rather than 
considering the various schemes in detail, it is possible to summarize the situation by the fact that all 
Scandinavian countries have observed declining employment ratios for elderly. In Denmark, this is in 
particular due to an early retirement scheme; in Norway, it is due to early retirement as well as increasing 
sickness and disability pensions, and in Sweden, it is due to an increase in the number of sick people and 
disability pensioners.  
 
In all Scandinavian countries, there is a debate on how to increase the retirement age. A pivotal element in 
the Danish debate has been the early retirement scheme. It subsidizes early retirement and is very popular, 
and therefore, it has proven difficult to change. Recently, the “Welfare Commission” proposed a number of 
measures to increase labour force participation and employment, including a phasing out of the early 
retirement scheme and linking the statutory pension age to longevity (Velfærdskommissionen, 2005b). In 
Norway, a commission evaluating the pension scheme has made a number of proposals for reforms of the   15
pension scheme in order both to ensure more pension savings and later retirement. One element is to make 
the annual public pension benefit depend on longevity, and at the same time allow for more flexibility in 
retirement. The implication is that given pension benefits can be maintained by postponing retirement when 
longevity increases. It is currently uncertain which reforms will be undertaken. In Sweden, there was a major 
pension reform in the 1990s leading to substantial changes in the pension system and introducing some 
mechanisms by which to handle the ageing problem. The basic mechanism is that pensions are reduced if the 
number of old increases, i.e. in this way pension benefits are linked to longevity (see e.g. Börsch-Supan 
(2005)). In combination with flexible retirement possibilities this creates incentives for later retirement 
alongside an increase in longevity. This reform is not sufficient to avoid a pressure on public finances, cf. 
above, and the need for reforms is currently debated, in particular the issue of how to increase labour supply. 
 
In debates on retirement, one often encounters the argument that the labour market discriminates elderly 
workers and therefore it is necessary to have fairly generous retirement options. It is a fact that the 
unemployment rate is higher for age groups close to the normal retirement age. However, it is potentially 
misleading to conclude from this that it is impossible to maintain a labour market for elderly workers. Cross-
country evidence documents a clear positive relationship between labour force participation of elderly 
workers and employment rates (Duval (2003)). Moreover, the age groups at which the additional 
unemployment is observed are very different across countries and very closely related to the rules applying 
in various countries. This suggests that the rules for retirement/pension play a key role. This is underlined by 
the fact that when comparing the Scandinavian countries (see Andersen and Pedersen (20006)), it is striking 
that the problems for elderly workers measured by additional unemployment are observed at age groups in 
the late 50s (early retirement is possible at the age of 60) in Denmark, while they are observed for the age 
group 62-65 in Norway and Sweden where retirement is normal at an age around 67 or 65. This suggests that 
the time horizon plays an important role for both the demand and the supply side of the labour market. 
Hence, if rules for retirement are relaxed based on the observation that elderly workers have higher 
unemployment, the problem may be pushed back one step, leaving a lower retirement age and employment 
ratio. 
 
Judged from policy debates there seems to be a strong preference for taking out the welfare gain caused by 
increasing longevity as an increase in the retirement period. Whether this is due to tax distortions or a 
preference shift is an open question. The former is reflected both in the implicit tax on later retirement and 
also in the common pool problem that single individuals do not take into account the aggregate consequences 
of increasing longevity and declining (relative) retirement ages. The latter is reflected in increasing reference 
to “the third life phase” and a change in the perception of being old from “not able to work” to “no longer 
working and wanting to spend time on various other activities”.   16
 
When discussing ageing and retirement etc., it is important to point out that the balance of the social contract 
(cf. figure 5) depends on the number of years each individual contributes to the scheme relative to the 
number of years each individual benefits from the scheme. Hence, to maintain a balance when longevity 
increases is a question of keeping the fraction of lifetime spent in the labour market unchanged, and this can 
be achieved either by later retirement or earlier entry to the labour market. Naturally, the latter is conditional 
on whether the relevant qualifications have been acquired. However, in recent years there has been a 
tendency towards later labour market entry by young people, in particular in Denmark and Sweden. There is 
thus a need to reverse this trend, and this is an important ingredient in ensuring a balance in the social 
contract when longevity increases. 
 
The ageing problem is a relative problem in the sense that the number of old people is increasing relative to 
the working age population, cf. figure 2. It is therefore intuitive to perceive migration as the solution. By 
allowing for migration to increase the working age population, the ”demographic” balance can be regained, 
i.e. the increase in the dependency ratio can be prevented. It is often suggested that migration is the most 
obvious solution to the ageing problem, see e.g. IMF (2004). 
 
There are two important reasons why it is important to distinguish between demographics and the financial 
problem of the welfare state. It is much easier to correct the former than the latter. The demographic changes 
have both a temporary and a permanent component. Migration can potentially deal with the temporary but 
not the permanent component. The temporary component is driven by the large cohort born after WWII and 
the subsequent drop in fertility rates. In the process where large cohorts retire and small cohorts enter the 
labour market, the dependency ratio increases, and in a welfare state with an extended social contract this 
obviously has important consequences. However, other things being equal the dependency ratio will fall 
again. Still, the problem is not trivial since demographic transitions run over decades. Whether immigration 
can help solve this problem depends critically on labour market consequences addressed below in section 6. 
 
However, there is a permanent change in the dependency ratio driven by increased longevity. For   given 
eligibility ages this implies that the balance in the social contract is changed since the number of years as net-
beneficiary increases relative to the number of years as net-contributor, cf. figure 5. The permanent 
component cannot be solved by immigration since immigrants also must be expected to live longer.  
 
Increased longevity is by most considered a welfare improvement, but the social contract would have to be 
revised to adapt to the change. Hence, permanent changes in welfare arrangements are needed.  Basically,   17
three options are available – increase taxes, lower benefits (or services) or delay retirement. The social 
contract needs to be adjusted to take account of increasing longevity.  
 
5.  Baumol meets Wagner – The growth dilemma 
In policy debates, there is a strong perception that more growth will ease the financial problems of the 
welfare state. Hence, it seems as if the viability of the welfare state can be ensured by resorting to more 
popular initiatives like further investments in education and research, rather than by changing retirement and 
pensions systems and the like. Unfortunately, the policy choices are not that simple. 
 
To set the scene, note that under two very basic assumptions it follows to a first approximation that public 
finances are not in the medium run improved by increasing growth, that is, revenues and expenditures are 
increasing proportionately. Increasing productivity and growth cause incomes to increase, and therefore 
public revenue will increase for given tax rates
12. The public sector basically has two types of expenditures – 
wages to employees and transfers. If the same number of public employees is needed (the service constraint), 
this cost component will increase proportionally with income since public sector wages in the medium term 
will have to move proportionally to private wages. To the extent the gains in living standard are to be 
distributed equally between the work force and recipients of income transfers to ensure an unchanged 
distribution between employed and non-employed (the distribution constraint), the latter component will also 
increase proportionally with income. Hence, revenues and expenditures move proportionally under the 
service and distribution constraint. Overruling the distribution constraint will by most be tantamount to a 
violation of basic objectives of the welfare state and hence not a viable policy option.  As to the service 
constraint, the issue is slightly more complicated. 
 
In the reasoning above, it was implicitly assumed that productivity increases are absent in the public sector, 
and therefore an unchanged amount of labour is needed if the same service provisions shall be available in 
the future. To put it differently, welfare services become relatively more expensive (Baumol’s law). 
Although for some types of welfare services it may be difficult to increase productivity by the very nature of 
the activity (e.g. care), there surely is scope for improving productivity for a number of activities (although 
on average not at the same level as for e.g. industrial production). To the extent that there are such 
improvements, they lessen the financial constraint. 
 
However, this should be seen in the perspective that increasing material well-being tends to increase demand 
for services (income elasticity above one – Wagner’s law), and therefore the needs and requirements for 
public services increase.  Which of these effects dominate is basically an empirical question driven by both 
technical and organisational/political mechanisms. The former relates to the scope for actually improving   18
efficiency and productivity in the provision of welfare services, and the latter whether the increasing 
demands should be accommodated. Since, as noted in the introduction, provision of welfare services at a 
level which meets the needs and requirements of the larger part of the population is an essential objective of 
the Scandinavian welfare model, it follows that a divergent path between demand and supply of welfare 
services would be problematic. 
 
The political constraint is revealed by the fact that public expenditure growth has been above the growth rate 
of income, and this can be interpreted as showing that in net-terms Wagner’s law has been dominating. If 
this holds in the future, the consequences are dire. To see the order of magnitudes involved, it has been 
estimated for Denmark that an increase in public expenditures of just 0.15 annually above the GDP growth 
rate (roughly half the extra growth observed over the last 30 years) would have effects on public finances of 
the same order of magnitude as the demographic shifts, i.e. a deterioration of public finances of about 4 % of 
GDP (Velfærdskommissionen (2005)).  
 
In a forward looking perspective, there are reasons to believe that the demand pressure will dominate the 
possible efficiency and productivity gains to be reaped. An important case in point is health care. New 
technologies in medicine imply both that some treatments can be done more easily and effectively, but it also 
implies improved and new treatments. Ample empirical evidence documents that the latter dominates. In 
forecasts of health care expenses, OECD (2005) outlines various scenarios implying a substantial 
expenditure pressure in health care. 
 
There is, however, a further aspect since increasing material well-being may be expected to lead to increased 
demand for leisure (shorter working hours, longer vacations, earlier retirement etc.). It is to be expected that 
the gains created by growth are to be shared between increased consumption of various forms and leisure. 
However, this reinforces the financial strain on the welfare state for the simple reason that leisure is not 
taxed. Hence, more growth may increase the demand for welfare services at the same time as it shrinks the 
base on which these activities are financed. The order of magnitude here is of the same size as for 
expenditure growth. For Denmark, a working time reduction of 0.1 % per year (significantly below historical 
average) would have effects on public finances of the same order of magnitude as the demographic shifts, i.e. 
a deterioration of public finances of almost 4 % of GDP (Velfærdskommissionen (2005)).The precise order 
of magnitudes of future increases in the demand for both improved and better welfare services as well as 
leisure are of course subject to uncertainty. However, the calculations reported here suggest that under 
relatively moderate assumptions, the effects of this “growth dilemma” can easily be as large as the effects of 
the demographic shifts. 
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A key question here is whether the willingness to pay taxes increases along these developments. If so, there 
would be less of a policy dilemma created by further growth. It is not obvious that the political tensions 
concerning tax rates today are less than they were say 25 years ago (having reached a tax burden of about 50 
% of GDP) despite the growth in incomes in the meantime. Moreover, tax distortions are increasing in the 
tax rate – approximately proportional to the square of the tax rate - and globalisation puts pressure on the 
taxation system, cf. below.  
  
The possible tension between demand and the scope for financing welfare services raises some difficult 
policy dilemmas. This may cause a growing tension between what is offered and what is expected/required, 
which in turn may cause an increasing dissatisfaction (potentially eroding the political support for the model) 
with public services breaking the premise that public services are supplied at a high level that meets the 
needs of most. It may also lead to an increasing use of private supplements primarily sought by those who 
can afford it, which in turn raises distributional questions. Free and equal access is being contested. Some 
scope for addressing these issues can be found in user payments (which exist in all Scandinavian countries 
for some health services), which can be used to affect use/demand and also as a source of revenue. However, 
this is not eliminating the problems, and extensive use of user payments runs counter to the distributional 
concerns motivating “free and equal access”. 
 
To sum, growth puts the tax financed welfare state in a financial dilemma. It tends to push expenditures in an 
upward direction (more and better provision of welfare services) and revenues in a downward direction 
(more leisure). Growth is not a new phenomenon, and it may therefore be questioned why this problem first 
surfaces now. The reason is that the welfare state has been in a build-up phase, and the financial base has 
been expanded via increases in taxes and labour force participation. Now it is in a consolidation phase where 
the consequences of Baumol’s law (a relative price increase of welfare services) and Wagner’s law (a high 
demand elasticity) become clear at the same.  
 
6.  Globalization – a threat to the social contract? 
Openness and tight international integration is not a new phenomenon for the Scandinavian countries. This 
is, among other things, reflected in the fact that these countries are routinely classified as small and open. It 
is also clear that the concern for and constraints set by “international competitiveness” have played an 
important role. After all, the welfare state has been substantially extended in a period where the 
Scandinavian countries have been very well integrated in the international economy. However, this does not 
imply that further globalization does not raise challenges in particular due to some of the qualitative changes 
induced. 
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At a general level, one can distinguish between three channels through which globalization may affect the 
welfare state, namely, taxation, spending (education and research) and migration. The challenges raised by 
the two first are not a threat to the basic principle of the Scandinavian welfare model, whereas migration 
potentially is. The three topics will be considered in turn. 
 
6.1 Taxation 
Since the Scandinavian welfare model is tax financed and therefore implies high tax rates, much focus has 
been on the question whether high tax rates are sustainable in a more globalized world. Much of this debate 
has been concerned with increasing tax base mobility. The basic mechanism is that the more mobile a given 
tax base, the more difficult it is to tax at a rate (significantly) above that of your close trading partners. To 
avoid loss of tax revenue due to further integration, the response must be lower tax rates, which in turn may 
erode tax revenue. A more aggressive response would be to undercut the tax rates of trading partners (i.e. tax 
competition leading to a race-to-the-bottom mechanism) in the hope of attracting more economic activity. 
Another response would be to change the tax structure, lowering taxes on mobile tax bases and increasing 
them on less mobile tax bases.  
 
The Scandinavian countries have gradually adapted their tax structure to cope with some of these changes, in 
particular via the so-called dual income taxation system (see e.g. Larsen and Sørensen (2003)), allowing a 
proportional taxation of capital income to be combined with progressive taxation of other forms of income. 
Therefore, it has been possible to adjust taxation of capital income and corporations to lower levels to match 
rates observed in competing countries while maintaining relatively high tax rates (and progressive elements) 
on labour income. They have also followed the trend of lowering corporate tax rates accompanied by some 
broadening of the tax base. Tax adjustments have also been made in specific areas such as excise taxes on 
e.g. alcohol to cope with problems arising from increased cross-border trade. 
 
While the issue of tax base mobility is important and raises a number of important and difficult questions 
concerning the tax system and control etc., it is an issue of second-order importance in relation to the overall 
question of the financing of the welfare state
13. This is so since the predominant part of tax revenue is raised 
via direct and indirect taxation in various forms of income generated in the labour market. The key question 
is thus how the scope for taxation of labour is affected by the globalization process.  
 
Tax distortions may be affected by globalization. With more easy options of relocating production and thus 
employment, it follows that job mobility increases. That is, employment creation becomes more sensitive to 
domestic conditions. If a larger fraction of jobs due to international integration are created in sectors with a 
more elastic labour demand, it follows unambiguously that the distortionary consequences of taxes levied on   21
labour are non-decreasing (see Andersen (2003)). Accordingly, the tax distortions increase alongside 
international integration, or to put it differently, the costs of raising tax revenue via taxation of labour 
increase. Moreover, and possibly even more importantly, a tendency – as observed - to towards more 
decentralized wage setting would reinforce these problems
14. As noted above under centralized wage setting, 
tax distortions may be lower because the public budget constraint is internalized. In a process where labour 
markets become more decentralized either due to international integration or due to other forces, it follows 
that tax distortions are on the increase. 
 
6.2 Spending 
Globalization may create a spending pressure. This is primarily driven by the effects of globalization on 
labour markets. Alongside technological change, globalization tends to induce a skill-bias in the demand for 
labour, i.e. decreasing demand for unskilled and increasing demand for skilled. Given the structure of labour 
markets, this tends to increase unemployment and thus the burden on social transfers, i.e. other things being 
equal there is a risk that it lowers the employment ratio. 
 
To avoid this it is commonly agreed that the educational level of the work force should be increased, in 
particular for the groups having no education beyond mandatory schooling. The idea is to counter the skill-
bias in demand via a reverse skill-bias in supply. While empirical evidence supports that this has worked in 
the past (see e.g. Fosgerau et. Al (2000)), it also points to an expenditure pressure to avoid a declining 
employment ratio. Hence, the financial constraint is tightened by these effects of globalization. 
 
6.3 Migration 
Increased migration is in particular a potentially important problem for the universal or Scandinavian model. 
The reason lies in the fact that the welfare model is comparable to an encompassing implicit (social) 
insurance contract, and like any insurance market, it becomes problematic if adverse or self selection implies 
that the ”good” risks leave and the ”bad” risks enter. The key determinant here is the labour market position 
of the potential emigrants and immigrants since this determines whether the person in financial terms is a net 
contributor or a net beneficiary to the welfare state. A problem arises if immigrants tend to have a below 
average attachment to the labour market since they would then be net beneficiaries of the welfare system. A 
parallel problem arises if there is an overrepresentation of highly educated individuals among emigrants 
since they tend to be higher net contributors to public finances. For these reasons, migration is a challenge 
which may have potential wide ranging implications for the Scandinavian welfare model. 
 
This creates some crucial dilemmas in economic policy. Consider first education and emigration. The public 
sector offers free education to provide equal opportunities and to reduce the risk in educational decisions.   22
Expenditures on education are financed via general taxation with some progressive elements, implying that 
those turning out to have the highest incomes after education will also pay the most in taxes. However, this 
model is vulnerable to mobility since the migration decision can be taken after benefiting from publicly 
financed education and the veil of ignorance in relation to labour market prospects has been lifted. Moreover, 
by moving to countries relying more on private financing of education and therefore having lower taxes and 
more wage dispersion, the individual gains from mobility can be high. 
 
The potential importance of increased emigration of the highly educated for public finances is very large. 
However, for the time being one cannot argue that this is a major problem, see e.g. Pedersen et al. (2003). 
Although there is some emigration of the highly educated, return migration is also high. However, future 
migration flows of the highly educated can be expected to move in only one direction. Various barriers to 
mobility such as language, culture and travelling time are reduced, and competition between countries to 
attract highly educated labour has intensified.
15  
 
Immigration is a very topical issue. The immigration pressure from low income countries is large. Over the 
past decades, all Nordic countries have experienced increased immigration from low income countries, and 
they face a number of challenges
16. The primary challenge is integration of immigrants into the labour 
market.  The problems here arise from the combination of two key features of the Scandinavian welfare 
model, namely, the distributional constraint implying high minimum wages and the requirement of a high 
employment rate. In short, the model has high demands for the qualifications of the work force 
(qualifications must be worth at least the minimum wages) and, at the same time, many are expected/needed 
to meet these requirements.
17. 
 
All Nordic countries face problems of ensuring that the employment ratio of immigrants reaches the same 
level as the rest of the population. Some of these problems are related to the structure of welfare 
arrangements for the reasons explained above. Figure 8 shows for a number of countries the difference 
between the employment frequency of the population and that of immigrants from low income countries. 
Scandinavian countries stand out with a large discrepancy between resident and migrant labour force 
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Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005) 
 
 
A number of factors can explain the difference. The gender gap reflects that female labour force participation 
has become the norm in the Scandinavian countries. It is an integral part of the welfare model and reflects a 
different position of women in society compared to many low income countries. In addition, most 
immigrants from low income countries have low qualifications, and this poses a particular problem in the 
Scandinavian countries since a compressed wage structure with high minimum wages implies that it is 
difficult for the low skilled to find work.
18  
 
For Denmark, assessments have been made of the implications of immigration from low income countries 
for the social contract, presuming that the current low labour force participation rate is maintained. 
Unsurprisingly, it is found that this form of immigration worsens the fiscal sustainability problem. In a 
counterfactual path with no further immigration from low income countries, it is shown that the problem of 
fiscal sustainability due to demographic shifts is reduced by about ¾ (Velfærdskommissionen (2005)). 
 
These problems have raised a delicate political problem in relation to immigration policy, namely, whether it 
is the immigration rules or the principles of the welfare state that should give in. Both have happened in 
Denmark.  Immigration laws have been tightened, and the universal principle has been modified. To qualify 
for eligibility in the social safety net, there is now an entry condition since one must have been a resident in 
Denmark for 7 of the past 8 years. If this condition is not met, one is only entitled to a social benefit 
(starthjælp/introduktionsydelse) at roughly half the level in the ordinary social system (kontanthjælp). Both 
of these measures are controversial and have been much debated. 
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In all the Scandinavian countries, there is an ongoing debate on how to strengthen the labour market 
integration of immigrants as well as how to reconcile basic principles of the welfare model with “open 
borders”. In a similar vein, there is much discussion about the risk of “brain drain” by emigration of the 
highly educated as well as the scope for attracting highly educated emigrants via tax rebates or more flexible 
immigration rules.  
 
7.  Direction for policy reforms and welfare regimes 
The Scandinavian countries have an extended welfare state, and have managed to combine a high income 
level with a fairly equal income distribution. Although there are many exceptions to the rule, welfare 
arrangements have a universal character with individual entitlements for all and collective financing via 
taxation. Pivotal for the financial viability of this model is that a high fraction of the population is in 
employment. The possibility of ensuring this is challenged by demographic changes, the growth dilemma 
and the effects of globalization. These problems may be intensified to the extent that work norms are 
changing, implying further pressure on welfare arrangements and difficulties in maintaining a high 
employment ratio. 
 
The policy dilemma is that many of the instruments with potential for increasing the employment rate run 
counter to other objectives. This applies in particular in relation to the distributional concerns, but also the 
preferences of the population. Policy debates often leave a gap between proposals to increase work and 
employment and the widespread perception that the work effort is already high as well as the demand for 
more leisure. This contrast is perhaps most visible in debates on the need to induce later retirement in tandem 
with the increasing longevity. This is often portrayed as a retrenchment of the welfare state when it is in fact 
a necessary adjustment of the social contract to changes in welfare improvement made possible by an 
increase in longevity. 
 
Is the Scandinavian model more vulnerable to globalization? On the one hand, the model has been developed 
in very internationally integrated economics, and it has historically been possible to combine extended 
welfare arrangement with “international competitiveness”. On the other hand, globalization is taking a new 
form strengthening pressure on tax bases via mobility and migration. Considering the scope for policy 
decisions, we are still far from a situation where the power of domestic politicians has been eroded, and there 
is ample of scope to influence policies. Internal and external challenges create a need for adjustment and 
reform, but not for a radical change in welfare regime. Empirical evidence has also documented a substantial 
persistence in welfare regimes across countries, and it is therefore not to be expected that reform processes in 
the Scandinavian countries will lead to fundamental changes in the basic principles underlying welfare 
arrangements. However, reforms and adjustment are needed to make the Scandinavian welfare model viable.   25
 
Notes 
                                                 
∗ Comments and suggestions by the discussants Lars Jonung and Paul Scnabel as well as participants at the conference 
”Reinventing the Welfare State”, The Hague, April 2006, are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
1 Whether the term ”the Scandinavian welfare model” is well-defined can be questioned. It is used here in the broad 
sense of universal and generous welfare arrangements, with the explicit proviso that such welfare arrangements are not 
confined to a particular geographical area. 
2 The difference in the extent to which various services are undertaken in the public sector or privately can cause a bias 
in international comparisons of income levels. 
3 E.g. to be entitled to social assistance in Denmark, it is a requirement that some social event is present (illness, 
divorce, loss of spouse, unemployment). The changes must be so substantial that self-support is not possible, and 
moreover, it should be caused be exogenous forces which could not be foreseen. The benefit is means tested (family 
income). 
4 It is not without problems to compare resource allocation via the public sector across countries (see e.g. Adema 
(2001)). One reason is that there can be huge differences solely from the fact that some countries have transfers to be 
taxable income, while in others, transfers are not taxable income. 
5 The estimate is for Denmark and based on the effects of a drop in private employment among people who are entitled 
to unemployment benefits. Calculated on the basis of analyses in Velfærdskommissionen (2005). 
6 In policy debates, this is often made a question of laziness. Do people want to work or not? This is a too narrow 
perspective to take on the participation decision. The real issue is how the whole complex of social and labour market 
policies affects the reservations demands (wage, type of job, willingness to commute etc.) for accepting a job. The 
higher the reservation demands in any of these dimensions, the less is the active labour market participation. 
7 If there is some disutility to participate actively in the labour market, the participation constraint can be met either by 
lowering benefits or by the demands in activation schemes. Hence, to any benefit level there is a corresponding 
activation requirement leaving the same incentive to work. 
8 The minimum wage is decided by law in Norway and Sweden, while in Denmark, it is negotiated between the labour 
market parties.   26
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 The way education is organised and financed may also affect the type of education being demanded. Moreover, there 
is an issue on how much education is used (hours supplied, retirement etc.) 
 
10 For theoretical analyses developing these ideas, see e.g. Eaton and Rose (1980), Varian (1980), Sinn (1995) and 
Acemogly and Shimer (2000). 
11 Velfærdskommissionen (2004, 2005a) documents that the permanent component in the demographic shift accounts 
for the major part of the fiscal sustainability problem for current welfare arrangements. 
12 In practice, this is not quite correct. Since some tax bases are depending on past income (e.g. taxation of pension 
funds), there will be a revenue drag if growth goes up, because not all tax bases grow at the same rate. See Andersen 
and Pedersen (2006) for a further discussion. 
 
13 This is supported by a quantitative assessment made by Sørensen (2000) of the implications of tax base mobility and 
tax competition for capital income taxation and corporate taxation. In accordance with theory, he finds that such taxes 
become inefficiently low, but compared to the initial situation, the consequences are very small in terms of production, 
employment etc. The important question is thus concerned with the direct and indirect implications for international 
integration for taxation of labour income. 
14 It is well documented that labour markets in the Scandinavian countries are becoming more decentralized (see Boeri 
et al. (2001)).  
15  It is often argued that high marginal tax rates on labour income are a particular problem in relation to migration for 
the highly educated. However, a migration decision is not a marginal decision, and is therefore affected by the whole 
welfare package, i.e. tax payments, but also the various entitlements. 
 
16 Immigration rules for refugees follow UN conventions. Since 2002, Denmark has had stricter rules for family 
unification. Immigration for economic reasons is only allowed if there are special labour market needs, except for 
European citizens where the rules are in accordance with the EU/EØS agreement on labour mobility. 
 
17 Note that this argument also holds even if immigration as such is not driven by the generosity of welfare 
arrangements (welfare magnets). Recent empirical work did not find evidence of selection effects driven by welfare 
arrangements, but this can be due to restrictive immigration rules, cf. Pedersen et al. (2004).   27
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
18 In addition, the economic gains from being active in the labour market can, for some groups, be small or absent, and 
finally there are incidences of discrimination. Comparing integration of immigrants in Denmark and Germany in 
Rockwool (2004), it is found that both countries had difficulties. The relative better performance of Germany can be 
attributed to i) better qualifications among immigrants, ii) lower minimum wages  and  iii) a large economic incentive to 
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